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In this paper, we show that the Shapley-Shubik market game model with production naturally generates
an equilibration mechanism that can accommodate price stickiness arising from strategic interactions of
firms. Unlike New Keynesian models that show similar price stickiness results, the market game model does
not require enforcing menu costs or other additional restraints on price adjustment mechanisms in order
to generate price stickiness. As such, we suggest that the market game model can provide a good micro-
foundation for macroeconomic analysis. We then explicitly show the relationship between a typical firm’s
markup of price over marginal cost and its market share.
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1. Introduction
Contemporary macroeconomic theory has been built on the three pillars of imperfect competition,
nominal price rigidity, and strategic complementarity. The stickiness of prices (and wages in par-
ticular) is a well-established empirical fact, with early observations about the phenomenon dating
back to Alfred Marshall. Because the friction of price stickiness cannot occur in perfectly compet-
itive markets, modern micro-founded (e.g., New Keynesian) models have been forced to abandon
the standard Arrow-Debreu paradigm of perfect competition in favor of models where agents may
influence market prices. Strategic complementarity enters the picture as a mechanism for explain-
ing the kinds of coordination failures that lead to sustained slumps like the Great Depression or
the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Early work by Cooper and John (1988) lay out the
importance of these three features for macroeconomics.
The need for imperfect competition becomes particularly transparent when one notes the impor-
tance of firms’ markups of prices over marginal costs in allowing for quantity adjustments indepen-
dently of price adjustments in response to market shocks. This is because prices equal marginal
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costs in competitive markets, and any variation in quantities must be accompanied by variations
in prices. For models with nominal rigidities to work, some degree of positive markups is necessary.
The role of markups in macroeconomic fluctuations has been examined closely by Rotemberg and
Woodford (1991, 1992, 1999). These papers have formed the basis for virtually all of the follow-on
work in the new classical synthesis, and its reliance on imperfectly competitive market structures
coupled with the dynamic structure of the neoclassical growth model. In most of this work, imper-
fect competition is introduced by imposing monopolistic competition via the Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) (hereinafter DS) model.
The DS model provides a simple and tractable way to model price-setting behavior in an other-
wise competitive setting that strips away the sophistication of strategic behaviors that appear in
settings of tight oligopoly. At the time of its introduction, the tractability of this model offset con-
cerns over the empirical fact of oligopoly (in many industries including grocery retailing, banking,
transportation, energy, telecommunications, and media), though in fairness to Dixit and Stiglitz,
we note that their original model was one of preferences for diversity, rather than specialization in
production.
Interestingly, there was another model around at that time which showed how to take explicit
account of imperfect competition and large firms in a general equilibrium setting, the market game
model developed by Shapley and Shubik (1977) and extended to production economies by Dubey
and Shubik (1977). The Shapley-Shubik market game (hereinafter, market game) model received
quite a bit of attention in the general equilibrium literature of the 1980’s and 1990’s, but was not
considered as an alternative to models of monopolistic competition in macroeconomics. While the
DS model certainly had important early adoption advantages (particularly in its first appearance as
a model of production specialization in trade theory), the sophistication of the market game model
likely deterred its applications, despite its distinct claim to being the best general equilibrium
extension of well-known models in industrial organization, in the sense of following the original
Nash framework for showing equilibrium in non-cooperative games (see, for example, Dubey and
Geanakoplos 2003).
We believe the market game model can provide a significantly better micro-foundation for
macroeconomics than do either the conventional real business cycle (hereinafter RBC) models
based on the neoclassical growth model, or New Keynesian (hereinafter NK) models based on
the DS model. Our belief is premised on the following three facts. First, as noted above, it is a
simple empirical fact that modern industrial economies are populated by large firms that interact
strategically across different markets in which they operate. These strategic interactions have been
widely studied in partial equilibrium contexts in the theory of Industrial Organization (hereinafter
IO), but macroeconomics has routinely ignored this branch of economics in favor of simpler models
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involving either perfect competition (RBC models) or models of local monopoly (the DS model).
The market game model has similarly been overlooked, despite its potential of allowing for sig-
nificant extension of findings in the IO literature to the general equilibrium. From an empirical
perspective, since the adoption of the monopolistic competition framework in macroeconomics,
there has been a marked increase in industrial concentration. The President’s Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors Issue Brief (2016) documents concentration since the 1980’s not only in technology
industries (e.g., aerospace, microchip, operating system, software, and smart phone) but also in
the traditional manufacturing and extractive industries, and in finance. As the report notes, some
of this increase in concentration has been due to technological innovations and associated scale
phenomena, and some has been due to mergers and acquisitions. Regardless of the cause, the
new empiricism of market power suggests that economists should be paying more attention to the
strategic interactions of large firms in oligopolistic market structures.
Second, oligopoly models allow the introduction of an additional strategic dimension beyond
imperfectly competitive pricing markups, which makes possible equilibrating quantity adjustment
processes – as we will show here – that do not require variation in prices, in some versions of the
model. This is in marked contrast to the additional frictions required in DS-based models (menu
costs or Calvo contracts) for price stickiness to occur. There are other papers that employ strategic
models to incorporate or generate price stickiness. For example, Fershtman and Kamien (1987)
study duopolistic competition in a model with a homogeneous good, and incorporate sticky prices
by assuming that the desirability of the good is an exponentially weighted function of accumu-
lated past consumption. Cellini and Lambertini (2007) extend Fershtman and Kamien (1987) by
considering a dynamic oligopolistic game where goods are differentiated with sticky prices. Slade
(1999) investigates the strategic implications of price adjustments, and empirically shows that
strategic behavior aggravates price rigidity in a dynamic oligopoly. Both Carvalho (2006)’s model
on heterogeneity in price stickiness and Fehr and Tyran (2008)’s model on limited rationality show
that nominal rigidity prevails under strategic complementarity. Finally, Bhaskar (2002) provides
a model of imperfect competition that produces a continuum of stable staggered price equilibria
by introducing two levels of strategic interactions of firms within and across industries. Bhaskar
(2002)’s model is the closest to ours in the sense that it shows how strategic interactions can end
up generating price rigidities, albeit in terms of adjustment staggering rather than general nominal
rigidity generated in our model.
Third, contemporary dynamic-stochastic-general-equilibrium (DSGE) models typically examine
fluctuations in output, employment, and prices around a fixed steady state. This is done despite
the fact that the data on business cycle fluctuations measure deviations in observed quantities
from endogenously generated trend growth paths. Before macro models can be brought to data,
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then, the data itself must be detrended, usually based on ad hoc assumptions on the nature of
economic growth. In RBC models, this is justified for the simple reason that long run growth in
the neoclassical growth model must be assumed exogenously. In NK models, where (as Romer
1990 has shown) long-run growth is possible given the increasing returns to specialization inherent
in the DS technology, macro applications of the model generally just ignore increasing returns
and adopt the RBC practice of working with detrended data and stochastic steady states. The
other well-known model of endogenous growth - the Schumpeterian model by Aghion and Howitt
(1992) - has seen only minor applications at the intersection of IO and macroeconomics (see, for
example, Aghion and Howitt 2000). The market game model, on the other hand, has the potential
to allow for explicit consideration of growth in terms of its ability to accommodate increasing-
returns-to-scale technologies, as well as the fact that it nests both DS and Aghion and Howitt
(1992) models given the abstract specification of production activities in the model. While dealing
explicitly with increasing-returns-to-scale technologies is more difficult than dealing with convex
technologies, it is not intractable. In an earlier study, Korpeoglu and Spear (2016) extend the
market game model with production to allow for increasing-returns-to-scale technologies, and show
how imperfect competition in the market game remedies the standard problem that competitive
firms operating under increasing-returns-to-scale technologies face of either wishing to produce
infinite output, or, if restricted to marginal-cost pricing, needing to be subsidized to offset losses.
This analysis also provides some weak results on the existence of equilibrium, though it should be
no surprise that strong existence results are unattainable when technology dictates limits on the
number of firms that can be active in equilibrium. (This paper is available as an online appendix
to the current paper.)
In this paper, we show that the market game generates equilibria that have two important fea-
tures. First, we show that when firms have market power, their market-shares in both input and
output markets affect the first-order conditions of their best responses, in ways that resemble the
effects of price changes. From this observation, we are able to establish that firm quantity adjust-
ments (holding input prices fixed) can maintain the Nash equilibrium of the model in versions
of the model that exhibit indeterminacy of the Nash equilibrium. Hence, these versions of the
model naturally admit sticky prices, regardless of the mechanism(s) that might lead firms to want
to keep input prices unchanging. To the best of our knowledge, this is a new result. Second, we
show that there is a close relationship between any individual firm’s markup of price over marginal
cost and its market share. As we noted above, the case for positive markups in macroeconomic
models has been argued persuasively by Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1992, 1999). The rela-
tionship between markups and market shares, however, has not received attention, to the best of
our knowledge. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), for example, consider a model of oligopoly, but
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focus on symmetric Nash equilibrium in which each firm’s market share is the same. This allows
them to make predictions about how markups change as a response to demand or productivity
shocks. What the market game brings to the discussion of markups that is new, is the fact that
markets populated by finite numbers of firms operating under possibly different technologies will
generate data on markup movements over different equilibria that can vary positively, negatively,
variably, or not at all over business-cycle-like expansions and contractions. This is interesting in
light of recent work by Nekarda and Ramey (2013) showing that “updated empirical methods and
data” indicate that markups are weakly procyclic or acyclic, in contrast to the results found in the
earlier work on markups and productivity co-movements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic market game
model; Section 3 provides the detailed analysis of price stickiness and markup variations; and
Section 4 concludes.
2. Model
We work initially with a standard market game model with production along the lines first consid-
ered by Dubey and Shubik (1977). In this section, we elaborate on the model ingredients. Most of
our formulation of the model and our notation will follow that of Peck and Shell (1990) and Peck
et al. (1992).
2.1. Agents
The economy consists of two types of agents: consumers (“she”) and firms (“it”). There are M <∞
consumers who are endowed with production inputs e¯i ∈ RN+ and sell these inputs to firms that
produce outputs from which consumers derive utility. For simplicity, we assume that consumers
derive no direct utility from the consumption of their input endowments.
Preferences of consumers are defined over output goods vectors xi ∈ RJ+. Utility functions are
assumed to be at least twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and
satisfy Inada conditions. There are Kj <∞ firms of finitely many types j ∈ {1,2, ..., J} that produce
output good j using a production technology specified by a production function qjkj = fkj (ϕkj ),
where ϕkj ∈RN+ is the vector of inputs for firm kj ∈ {1,2, ...,Kj} in production sector j ∈ {1,2, ..., J},
and each production function is twice continuously differentiable and strictly quasi-concave. We
will denote the total number of firms by J =∑Jj=1Kj . We assume that consumers are exogenously
endowed with ownership shares of each firm. Specifically, we let θkji be consumer i’s ownership
share of firm kj in sector j.
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2.1.1. Firm actions. Firms purchase production inputs from consumers and use them to
produce outputs, which they then sell back to consumers based on their expectations of prices they
can receive for their outputs. Since firms are not endowed with production inputs, they must bid
for these inputs on input trading posts (which are endemic to the market game). We assume that
firms aim to maximize their profits.1 We let pj be the price of output good j, and rn be the price






jfkj (ϕkj )− r ·ϕkj . (1)
Input prices are determined on input trading posts. We let wnkj denote firm kj ’s bid on input
trading post n ∈ {1,2, ...,N}, and wkj = (w1kj ,w2kj , ...,wNkj ) ∈RN+ denote firm kj ’s vector of bids for





wnkj . As is standard, we let W
n
−kj
denote the aggregate bid at trading post n except for the bid of firm kj . Moreover, we let eni denote




i denote the aggregate offer at input
trading post n. Then, the price of input good n is then defined as rn = W
n
En
. Firm kj ’s allocation of








This is just the standard market game rule that allocates each firm the same proportion of the
aggregate offer of the input good as its bid is to the aggregate bid. Firms earn unit of account
revenues from the sale of their outputs on trading posts for output goods. Given qjkj = fkj (ϕkj ) for
j ∈ {1, ..., J}, firm kj will offer all of its output on the output trading post j, so we can define the
aggregate offer at trading post j as Qj =
∑Kj
kj=1
qjkj . As before, we let Q
j
−kj denote the aggregate
offer at trading post j except for the offer of firm kj . Given the price pj for the output good j,
firm kj can spend pjq
j
kj
units of account on the purchase of input goods. Hence, firm kj faces the
following budget constraint for its bids on inputs
N∑
n=1
wnkj ≤ pjqjkj . (3)












which means that firm kj ’s profit cannot be negative. If the firm’s budget constraint (3) is not
satisfied, then its input allocation is zero and all of its offers are confiscated.
1 In the absence of perfect competition, it is well known that shareholders can disagree on the objective of the firm
they own. As it is beyond the scope of this paper to justify that profit maximization is the correct objective for the
firm operating under increasing-returns-to-scale technology, we just take this assumption as it is.
2 The fictional trading posts introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1977) are essentially a metaphor for flows of expen-
diture and product between traders. By collecting these flows for specific markets on “trading posts,” it simplifies
the actions of choosing demand and supply allocations and streamlines the exposition of the market game form. In
equilibrium, though, it is only the flows of expenditure and product that matter, not where they take place.
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2.1.2. Consumer actions. Consumers bid on trading posts for output goods. Because con-
sumers derive no utility from the consumption of their input endowments, but receive income from
selling these inputs, consumers will sell as much of their endowments as possible to firms. Consumer









where the aggregate bid W n on the input market n is determined by firms’ production decisions. In
addition to their income from the sale of input endowments, consumers also receive (exogenously













i pikj . (4)
Note that if we had a small number of consumers, given the arbitrary distribution of ownership
shares across consumers, consumers might want firms they own to deviate from profit maximization
in order to increase the value of their sales of input endowments. This failure of shareholder
unanimity in models with imperfect competition is well known. As we do not provide any insight
into this issue here, we will simply assume that consumers take the value of their endowment offers
and the value of their profit shares as given. This can be justified more rigorously by assuming that





negligible, and that ownership of firms is diffusely distributed. We let bji denote consumer i’s bid
on output trading post j ∈ {1,2, ..., J}, and bi = (b1i , b2i , ..., bJi ) ∈ RJ+ denote consumer i’s vector of




i . As above, we let B
j
−i denote
the aggregate bid at trading post j except for the bid of consumer i. The price of output good j is
then defined as the ratio of the total bid for the output good j to the total offer of the output good
j, i.e., pj = B
j
Qj
. Consumer i’s allocation of output good j is given by her own bid for the output








This is just the standard market game rule that gives each consumer the same proportion of the
aggregate offer of the output good as her bid is to the aggregate bid. Consumer i faces the following
budget constraint for bids on outputs
J∑
j=1












i pikj . (6)
As with firms, if the consumer’s budget constraint is violated, her allocation is zero and all of her
offers are confiscated.
2.2. Market Game and Nash Equilibrium
With these definitions and characterization of agents in the model, we can now formally define the
market game Γ.
Chen, Korpeoglu, and Spear: Price Stickiness and Markup Variations in Market Games
8
Definition 1. Consumer i’s strategy set is
Si =
{
(bi, ei)∈R2J+ |ei < e¯i
}
for i∈ {1,2, ...,M}.






The full strategy set that then defines the offer-constrained game Γ (eˆ) is
S =×Mi=1Si×Kj ,Jkj=1,j=1 Skj .
Definition 2. A Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move market game consists of consumers’
bids for outputs, and firms’ bids for inputs given expectations of other agents’ actions such that
1. All agents’ bids are best responses given their expectations of other agents’ bids, of consumers’
input offers, and of firms’ output offers;
2. The best responses are consistent with all agents’ expectations of other agents’ actions.





but takes other firms’ (including those of other sectors) bids for inputs into account. Firm kj
maximizes its profit in (1) subject to the allocation rule in (2) and budget constraint in (3) given
the input price rn =W n/En and output price pj =Bj/Qj . Plugging constraints (2) and (3) into





















































− 1 = 0. (8)









− 1 = 0. (9)
Note that if the market contains a very large number of firms, ratios W n−kj/W
n and Qj−kj/Q
j in




= rn, which states that the value of the
marginal product of input good n is equal to the price of input good n.
While choosing her utility-maximizing bids, consumer i takes the aggregate output Qj as given,
but takes other consumers’ bids for outputs into account. Consumer i maximizes her utility ui [xi]
subject to the allocation rule in (5) and budget constraint in (6). Plugging the constraint (5) into
































qjkj − r ·ϕkj
]
. (11)
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where λ is the Lagrange multiplier of consumer i’s budget constraint in (11). Note that we do not
need to consider the effect of a change in consumer i’s bid on input prices because of the envelope
theorem as applied to firms’ profit maximization problems. Finally, note that if the market contains
a very large number of firms, the total offer Qj on output trading post j approaches infinity, and
if the market contains a very large number of consumers, the ratio Bj−i/Bj approaches one. Then,
the consumer first-order condition (12) boils down to what we get in the competitive limit, the







In this section, we provide the analysis of price stickiness and markup variations. Korpeoglu and
Spear (2016) (see the online appendix) show conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a
production market game with arbitrary returns-to-scale-technologies. Unlike in the case of strictly
convex technologies, there are no strong existence results in the case of increasing-returns-to-scale
technologies, for the simple reason that the non-negativity constraint on profits can become binding
when there are many increasing-returns-to-scale firms in the market. For our purposes here, then,
we will simply assume that there can be increasing-returns-to-scale firms in each production sector
together with standard constant or decreasing-returns-to-scale firms, and that the Nash equilibrium
associated with the aggregate input endowment E exists.
The result we present here is essentially a comparative static result showing that if firms cannot
(or do not wish to) vary input prices, they can accommodate shocks to production or demand via
adjustments in output. This is conceptually no different from what occurs in competitive models.
What is new with the market game is the fact that some of this accommodation can be achieved
via adjustments in firm market shares on both input and output markets. In the presence of
coordination indeterminacies, this new adjustment mechanism can give rise to novel equilibrium
behavior in the model.
We will consider two variants of the model. The first is the standard, simultaneous-move Shapley
and Shubik (1977) model with production (as laid out above). It is well-known that in pure exchange
versions of this model, there are a continuum of Nash equilibria due to the fact that agents in
the model choose both bids and offers. This choice is indeterminate, however, since the first-order
conditions with respect to bids or offers are the same. In imperfectly competitive markets, one of
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the choices between bids and offers is redundant for individual agents, though it affects prices in the
model via variations in market thickness (see Peck and Shell 1991 or Peck et al. 1992 for details).
In the production model, no such indeterminacy is possible for the simple fact that consumers earn
income from the sale of their endowments. Hence, in this version of the model, the comparative
static result shows that any accommodation to shocks (with sticky prices) will necessarily involve
some degree of involuntary unemployment of input resources. We conjecture that same form of
neo-Keynesian coordination failure equilibria can be generated in the model, though not without
a significantly more sophisticated (likely search-theoretic) micro-foundation for the input markets,
which we do not pursue here.
In the second variant of the model, we introduce a real indeterminacy by allowing agents to
short sell their endowments by offering more than they own, subject to the constraint that in
equilibrium, they must buy back the short amount. This version of the model is based on the one
originally introduced by Peck and Shell (1990). Peck and Shell (1990) note that this version of the
market game must be modified by changing the bankruptcy rules so that if any consumer does
not satisfy her budget constraint, every consumer is forced to consume her endowment. This rule
change is necessary because for very large short sales, the game “referee” may not be able to find
an equilibrium using only the resources of non-bankrupt consumers. Since this variation on the
production market game does not require any consumer to offer less than her full endowment, it is
consistent with the non-cooperative incentive consumers in the production game have for earning
income.
For both versions of the game, the starting point for our analysis is the individual firm’s first-






Dϕfkj − WˆWˆ−1−kjr= 0.
The significance of writing the first-order conditions this way stems from the fact that variations






affect the firm’s optimal choice, in the same way that variations

























is firm kj ’s
market share on the input market n. Since market shares can be varied independently of aggregate
bids on output or expenditures on inputs, this suggests the possibility of altering firms equilibrium
output quantities via adjustments in market shares without changing prices.
To analyze the possibility of price preserving perturbations in the market game, we first note
that since we only have (J−1)N independent expenditure shares, we would need another N
variables in order to make a full-rank perturbation of the system of equations consisting of firm first-
order conditions. We can pick up these variables by allowing for variations in the firms’ aggregate
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expenditures on inputs (which we can think of as flexible inside money or credit in the market
game setting, or as a monetary policy action in a macro interpretation of the model). To get a
price rigidity result, we need to append the condition
r− WˆE = 0
(where E is the vector of aggregate input offers) to the firm first-order conditions, giving us a
system of JN +N equations in JN variables. To get a full-rank perturbation of this system, then,
we need an additional N variables. We cannot use the output market shares as these variables as
they are not independent of firm output quantities. In a partial equilibrium setting, we might think
of using the output prices themselves as variables (assuming there are at least as many output
goods as there are input goods). But, in a general equilibrium setting, we need the output prices
(or, equivalently, the aggregate bids of consumers for output goods) to ensure equilibrium in the
output markets. This logic, then, gives us our first result.
Proposition 1. For the simultaneous-move market game, equilibrium responses to demand or
technology shocks will generically (in production functions) require variations in prices.
The genericity argument here simply requires noting that if some shock left (say) input prices
constant, then the firm would be moving up or down an expansion path homothetically. An arbi-
trarily small perturbation in the firm’s production function will then destroy this homotheticity.
We can get a full rank perturbation that keeps input prices constant if we have an indeterminacy
in consumers’ aggregate offers, since this gives us the additional N variables we need. So, we now
consider the Peck and Shell (1990) short-sale variant of the model that gives rise to indeterminacy.
As we noted above, in the short-sale model, consumers are allowed to offer more than their total
endowment on the input market, as long as they buy back the excess offer. This gives consumers
the opportunity to affect market shares, which will matter if the input markets are strategic, i.e.,
if firms are not negligible.
As Peck and Shell (1990) note, the key to analyzing the short-sale version of the market game is
the so-called offer-constrained game, in which consumers’ offers are fixed exogenously, and viewed
as parameters the underlying game. The utility of the offer-constrained game stems from the fact
that, with bid-offer indeterminacy, any equilibrium in the offer-constrained game will also be an
equilibrium in the unconstrained game.




(bi, ei)∈RJ+N+ |ei = eˆi
}
for i∈ {1, ...,M}.






Chen, Korpeoglu, and Spear: Price Stickiness and Markup Variations in Market Games
12
The full strategy set that then defines the offer-constrained game Γ (eˆ) is
S (eˆ) =×Mi=1Si (eˆi)×Kj ,Jkj=1,j=1 Skj .
A Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move offer-constrained market game consists of consumers’
bids for outputs, and firms’ bids for inputs given expectations of other agents’ actions such that
1. All agents’ bids are best responses given their expectations of other agents’ bids, of consumers’
input offers, and of firms’ output offers;
2. The best responses are consistent with all agents’ expectations of other agents’ actions.
For the short-sale game, we need to modify the punishment (as in Peck and Shell 1990) to
state that if any consumer violates her budget constraint, all agents’ allocations revert to their
endowments. In the short-sale game, we would also formally modify the definition of the consumer’s
strategy set to require that eˆi ≥ e¯i, where, as before, e¯i is consumer i’s endowment vector.
With these preliminaries, we can now show our main result.
Theorem 1. Generically, there exist solutions to the production side equilibrium equations in vari-
ables consisting of firm input wage bill shares, aggregate input quantities, and aggregate input bids,
in a neighborhood of any given offer-constrained Nash equilibrium for the economy.
Proof : See Appendix A.
Given that output prices variables are not used to equilibrate the production side of the economy,
they will continue to serve their usual purpose in equilibrating the demand side of the model.
One can apply conventional general equilibrium techniques to show a similar generic transversality
result for this equilibration process, though since this is not germane to our results, we do not
pursue it here. Since the proof of this result makes use of the implicit function theorem, we can also
include perturbations in actual endowments as well as offers to the list of equilibration parameters,
although this result is tangential to our basic results. We also conjecture that a similar result could
be obtained if firms were also allowed to offer, as well as bid for input goods, but do not pursue
that here.
3.1. Discussion
The most striking thing about the continuum of equilibria generated in the short-sale model is
the fact that the economy is always at full employment of input resources. The theorem implies
that variations in short-sale amounts will lead to adjustments in firm market shares (on both input
and output markets), which can lead to non-trivial variations in total output. One could extend
this result to a stochastic market game in which the short-sale offers varied according to some
extrinsic random variable (i.e., a sunspot), as in Peck and Shell (1991). This would result in a
stochastic general equilibrium for the model in which individual firm market shares are constantly
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changing. As we will show in the next section, this variation in market shares leads, in turn, to
variations in the observed mark-ups that imperfectly competitive firms charge. In a heterogenous
returns-to-scale environment, then, one of the key relationships in New Keynesian macro models -
the variation of mark-ups over the business cycle - will be disrupted.
3.2. Markup Variations
As we noted in Introduction, it is a stylized fact in NK macro models that markups vary counter-
cyclically. In a recent study, as Nekarda and Ramey (2013) note, however, the estimation of marginal
costs from available data is quite tricky, and early attempts to study markup variations over
the business cycle ended up relying on theoretical relationships (based typically on DS-based NK
models) for the specification of marginal costs. Nekarda and Ramey (2013) revisit the question
of cyclical movements in markups using updated adjustments of inputs to production functions
typically used in such studies, and using a combination of aggregate and manufacturing-specific
data. Contrary to the conventional stylized fact, they establish that markups are unconditionally
procyclic. Specifically, they find that monetary, government spending, and technology shocks lead to
procyclical markups, and consumer demand shocks lead to slightly procyclical or acyclical markups.
We will show in this section that the market game model also makes specific predictions about
markup variation in response to (comparative static) expansions or contractions, but, because firms
can exhibit heterogeneity in the returns-to-scale properties of their technologies, the aggregate
observed markup variation can be quite different from that of any particular firm.
We start by writing the firm’s cost-minimization problem:
min
w





where the vector ι= (1,1, ...,1) is a sum vector. The first-order conditions of this problem are
ιT −λDfT Wˆ−2Wˆ−kEˆ = 0,
which reduces to
rT WˆWˆ−1−k −λDfT = 0.
Since the Lagrange multiplier in the cost-minimization problem is just the marginal cost, if we





rT WˆWˆ−1−kϕ (q) .












Df ·ϕ (q) = pQ−k
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.













This result shows that if firm k’s market share increases, its markup also increases. Because the
firm’s equilibrium market share depends on its own and other firms’ technologies, we have no
a priori reason to believe that measures of average market shares (and hence observed average
markups) move in any systematic way during expansions or contractions. In the next section, we
show in two examples that individual firm market shares can increase or decrease as we move from
low-input-use equilibrium to high-input-use equilibrium.
3.3. Example 1
In this section, we provide a simple example with two firms that use a single input to produce
a single output good, and carry through the equilibration calculations for firm-side input pertur-
bations, without taking explicit account of the equilibration required on the demand side of the
model. We let L(=L1 +L2) denote the exogenously given aggregate offer of the input (hereinafter,
labor). Production functions of firm 1 and 2 are
q1 = f1(L1) =L21 and q2 = f2(L2) = [L2− K¯]α, (13)
respectively, where 0<α< 1 and K¯ is a fixed real cost of production for firm 2. We let Q(= q1 +q2)
denote the aggregate output. We also let wi denote firm i’s bid on labor and W (=w1 +w2) denote
the aggregate bid on labor. As in the model, the price of input is r =W/L, and the price output














respectively. Firms take the aggregate offer of labor L as given, but take the other firm’s bid on











, qi = fi(Li).






















− 1 = 0. (15)





[f2(L2)f ′1(L1)]− 1 = 0.























s2s1 = 1. (16)
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[f1(L1)f ′2(L2)]− 1 = 0.









]α−1− 1 = 0. (17)






If we let αˆ= α
2
, s2 = s and s1 = 1− s, this condition reduces to the following simple quadratic form
(1− αˆ)Ls2 + [2αˆL− K¯] s− αˆL = 0. Furthermore, if K¯ = 0, it reduces to s = √αˆ√
αˆ+1
. Substituting
back into (16) or (17) will then determine what output price must be, given any equilibrium input
levels including input price. Thus, if K¯ = 0 and α= 0.5, both firms make positive profits. Deviations
away from K¯ = 0 or α = 0.5 can lead to firm equilibrium in which firms make negative profits.
Obviously, in a dynamic context, this would necessitate that such firms make a decision on whether
to remain in the market.
3.4. Example 2
In this section, we provide an example with three firms that use a single input (i.e., labor) to produce
a single output. Interestingly, this example explicitly shows the existence of multiple equilibria
even in the one-input, one-output model (for similar examples, see Benhabib and Farmer 1994 and
references therein). Production functions of firm 1, 2, and 3 are as follows:
Firm1 : q1 = f1(L1) =A ·L21,
Firm2 : q2 = f2(L2) =B ·Lα2 , 0<α< 1
Firm3 : q3 = f3(L3) =C ·L3.
We next consider profit maximization problems of these firms. Firm i’s best response to other











, qi = fi(Li).


































f ′1(L1)(w2 +w3) = 1. (18)
















f ′3(L3)(w2 +w1) = 1, (20)
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respectively. We denote the share of input by si =wi/W , where i∈ {1,2,3}. The aggregate output
is given by Q=A · (s1L)2 +B · (s2L)α +C · s3L. Substituting si and Q into (18), (19), and (20), we
obtain the following conditions for firms 1, 2, and 3, respectively:
p
r










(A(s1L)2 +B(s2L)α) ·C(s1 + s2)
A(s1L)2 +B(s2L)α +Cs3L
= 1.
We can solve for the equilibrium shares from the following three equations in three variables:
(2ABs1(s2 + s3)sα2 −αABs21(s1 + s3)sα−12
) ·Lα+1 + 2ACs1s3(s2 + s3) ·L2−αBCs3sα−12 (s1 + s3) ·Lα = 0,
2ABs1(s2 + s3)sα2 ·Lα+1 +
(
2ACs1s3(s2 + s3)−AC(s1 + s2)s21
) ·L2−BCsα2 (s1 + s2) ·Lα = 0,
s1 + s2 + s3 = 1.
Figure 1 demonstrates equilibrium shares for three equilibria that occur under A = B = C = 1,
and α= 0.5 as the aggregate input L varies. Interestingly, in each equilibria, the share of at least
one firm approaches zero as the aggregate input L gets large. This, in turn, leaves three possible
equilibrium industrial organization modes: i) monopoly with the decreasing-returns-to-scale firm
in equilibrium 2 of Figure 1, ii) stable duopoly with increasing- and constant-returns-to-scale firms
in equilibrium 1 of Figure 1, and iii) stable duopoly with decreasing- and constant-returns-to-scale
firms in equilibrium 3 of Figure 1. In equilibrium 2 of Figure 1, increasing- and constant-returns-
to-scale firms both make positive profits regardless of the market thickness. However, when the
market is thin (i.e., L is small), the decreasing-returns-to-scale firm makes positive profit; and
when the market is thick (i.e., L is large), the decreasing-returns-to-scale firm makes negative
profit. However, in equilibrium 2 of Figure 1, when the market is thick, the decreasing-returns-to-
scale firm dominates the market while incurring negative profit. Thus, for all three firms to make
positive profits in equilibrium 2, the market must be sufficiently thin (i.e., L is sufficiently small).
In equilibrium 1 of Figure 1, all three firms make positive profits regardless of the thickness of the
market. In equilibrium 3 of Figure 1, the increasing-returns-to-scale firm always makes negative
profits with very small and diminishing market share, so it is likely that it will eventually exit the
market, and the other two firms will share the market and earn positive profits. In this example,
we can still obtain the multiplicity result if all three firms make positive profits (equilibrium 1 and
3 when market is sufficiently thin).
Figure 2 illustrates equilibrium shares for two equilibria that occur under A= 1, B = 2, C = 3,
and α= 2/3, and in both equilibria the decreasing- and constant-returns-to scale firms make posi-
tive profits. In equilibrium 1 of Figure 2, when the market is thin (i.e., L is small) the increasing-
returns-to-scale firm has negative profits, and when the market is thick (i.e., L is large) the
































Figure 1 Input share allocations across increasing- (IRTS), decreasing- (DRTS), and constant- (CRTS) returns-
to-scale firms as the aggregate input L varies in logarithmic scale. Setting: A=B =C = 1, α= 0.5.
increasing-returns-to-scale firm makes positive profit. The equilibrium 2 of Figure 2 is similar to
the equilibrium 3 of Figure 1 in the sense that the increasing-returns-to-scale firm always makes
negative profit, and has diminishing market shares and it is likely to exit the market eventually,
while the other two firms share the market and earn positive profits.
The two examples above show that thin market equilibria may generate negative profits while
thick market does not, and thick market equilibria may also generate negative profits while thin
market does not (in which case the dominant firm will eventually exit the market). We also observe
that if the increasing-returns-to-scale firm has very small market share, it makes negative profit
and is likely to exit the market, while the other two firms make non-negative profits, and are
likely to share the market. If the decreasing-returns-to-scale firm dominates the market, it makes
negative profit; if it does not dominate the market, which is when the market is sufficiently thin,
all three firms make nonnegative profits. The possibility of profits being negative in these examples
reflect the fact that these examples do not calculate the full Nash equilibria for the model, but
rather only the firms’ responses to variations in the input to production, holding the input prices
constant. In a full Nash-equilibrium calculation, firms facing negative profit would need to make
an exit decision, with the final equilibria then being based on a smaller number of active firms in
the market.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
We have shown that variants of the Shapley-Shubik market game model with production can
generate an equilibration mechanism that can lead to multiple equilibria when the number of active
firms is small. The equilibration process can accommodate nominal price rigidities, without any
need for enforcing menu costs or other additional restraints on price adjustment. We also explicitly
show the relationship between a typical firm’s markup of price over marginal cost and its market
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Figure 2 Input share allocations across increasing- (IRTS), decreasing- (DRTS), and constant- (CRTS) returns-
to-scale firms as the aggregate input L varies in logarithmic scale. Setting: A= 1, B = 2, C = 3, α= 2/3.
share. The model itself is silent on what might cause price rigidities, and how different mechanisms
(e.g., menu costs, search frictions, and learning) might interact with the basic model. We believe
there are some interesting arguments in favor of learning and evolutionary dynamics that arise
from the general equilibrium considerations in our analysis.
The problems with finding effective mechanisms for implementing equilibrium prices in compet-
itive economies are well known. Scarf (1960)’s example shows that the presence of strong income
effects can make simple price adjustment dynamics like the Walrasian tatonnement process inef-
fective. While the market game does provide an explicit price formation mechanism via the ratio
of expenditure flows to quantity flows, Kumar and Shubik (2004) show that the market game is
not immune to Scarf (1960)-like problems for simple adjustment dynamics akin to tatonnement.
On the other hand, there are a series of strong results in the literature on evolutionary game
theory showing that when the Nash equilibrium to a game is strict (i.e., when the equilibrium is in
pure strategies), then fitness-based (replicator) dynamics in which better responses to other agents’
play are imitated lead to convergence to the Nash equilibrium. These results have not received
much attention in the conventional general equilibrium analysis or related work in macroeconomics
because of the time-scales on which these dynamics operate, and the often non-market-based nature
of the interactions generating the convergence.
What the evolutionary game theory results do suggest (particularly in light of the fundamen-
tal problems introduced by income effects) is that equilibrium (either Nash or competitive) is
something that must be learned rather than mechanically implemented. To the extent that Nash
equilibria of the market game are evolutionarily stable, i.e., immune to deviations from Nash
equilibrium strategies, the learning costs will be quite high since pricing experiments themselves
become costly. Hence, the relatively more complex nature of evolutionary learning, as opposed to
simple mechanical price adjustment processes, makes attaining an equilibrium costly, and provides
an incentive for maintaining equilibrium prices once they are learned.
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From a less heterodox perspective, the literature on search and matching, based on the seminal
work of Burdett and Judd (1983), is capable of generating both price stickiness and staggered
price adjustment in otherwise conventional economic models. This framework, particularly at the
interface between wholesale and retail intermediaries could easily be adapted to the model we have
presented here.
One thing that is clear from this discussion is that further work embedding the market game
with production in a dynamic quantitative setting is worth undertaking.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1.
We provide the proof of the generic applicability of the implicit function theorem here. It remains,
then, to show that the implicit function theorem (or, more generally, a transversality result) will
apply in the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium for an economy under slack. The Jacobian
matrix for the mapping defined by equilibrium conditions has JN +N rows (corresponding to
the equilibrium first-order conditions and input price equations, respectively), and (J − 1)N +
2N columns (corresponding to the input market shares, aggregate input offers, and aggregate
expenditures on inputs, respectively). For specificity, we note that we are making a change of






Given this change of variables, variations in the aggregate level of expenditures on inputs holding
input expenditure shares constant then means that each firms’ expenditures scale as the aggregate
does. In the input pricing equation
r− Eˆ−1W = 0
we take r as a vector of parameters indicating the input price level firms at which would like prices
to remain constant. With these definitions, the Jacobian matrix isG Φ 0H ΦJ 0
0 −Wˆ Eˆ−2 Eˆ−1
 .
The derivatives here are evaluated at the sell-all equilibrium values. The adjustments needed to
show the rank result for the short-sale and low employment cases are straight-forward, so we
concentrate here on the sell-all game. The derivatives of the first-order conditions with respect
to aggregate input expenditures are zero because these always appear in the expenditure share
terms, and not alone. The matrix G is given by
G =
G1 · · · 0... . . . ...
0 · · · GJ−1
 ,
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i.e., the matrix of derivatives of firm first-order conditions with Eˆ = diag E and rˆ = diag r. The





and consists of the derivatives with respect to aggregate input offers of the firm first-order condi-

















The matrix ΦJ is N ×N . The matrix H is
H =
[−GJ · · · −GJ ] ,
which reflects the adding up constraint on the input shares.
We note that if production functions are all concave, then each Gj is positive definite. If some
production function f is strictly quasi-concave, then (assuming f is homogeneous of degree δ > 1),

















since the strict quasi-concavity assumption implies that the matrix is negative definite in directions
orthogonal to Df. This condition, in turn, requires that δ < 1 + ‖Df‖
2
Q
. In general, though, we can
not guarantee definiteness of the Gj matrices. We can, however, guarantee that these matrices have
full rank generically, and since we will need to make such genericity arguments below, we simply
assume this for now.
Now, with each of the Gj matrices having full rank, we can reduce the Jacobian matrix to the
following matrix G 0 00 Ψ 0
0 0 Eˆ−1
 ,
where N ×N matrix Ψ = ΦJ −HG−1Φ.
If it turns out that the matrix Ψ is singular, then we can perturb the production functions by









firm’s production function, where εkj is strictly positive and small, ϕ¯kj is the firm’s Nash equilibrium
input allocation, and Akj is an arbitrary bordered negative definite matrix, with bordering vectors
colinear with Dfkj . This then allows us to perturb the matrices in HG
−1Φ (without perturbing
the gradients of firm production functions, and hence of Ψ) and guarantee that Ψ has full rank
generically.
